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Abstract: In this paper we offer an argument against supererogation and in favour of moral 
perfectionism. We argue three primary points: 1) That the putative moral category is not generated 
by any of the main normative ethical systems, and it is difficult to find space for it in these systems 
at all; 2) That the primary support for supererogation is based on intuitions, which can be undercut 
by various other pieces of evidence; and 3) That there are better reasons to favour perfectionism, 
including competing intuitions about the good-ought tie-up, and the epistemic preference for 
theoretical simplicity. 
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1. Introduction1 
 Supererogatory actions are a putative category of moral actions which go above and 
beyond what we are obliged to do. Since Urmson’s famous 1958 paper, ‘Saints and heroes’, the 
topic of supererogation has benefitted from a surge of fascinating new literature. Most of us are 
familiar with many common examples of supererogatory actions: the soldier who throws himself 
on a grenade to save his friends; the doctor who decides to leave his practice behind to serve 
during a malaria outbreak in a third-world country; the millionaire who gives away his entire 
fortune to charity; etc. Many people find intuitive the thesis that such people have performed a 
task so demanding that we could not possibly expect it of someone, and hence that such acts must 
be supererogatory. 
 Yet this intuitive support is surprisingly fragile. There are undercutting defeaters or 
plausible alternative interpretations for the most prominent supporting intuitions, and 
supererogatory action is so poorly integrated into normative ethical theories that as soon as the 
intuitions are defeated, much motivation for including it in one’s normative ethical theory 
dissolves. We will argue, on these grounds and others, that we ought to give up the idea of 
supererogatory action in favour of the more robust and well-supported view that the best and the 
required are one and the same. 
 
2. Thesis Clarification 
 Let us begin with some clarifications regarding our thesis: this will allow precision of 
exposition as well as the refutation of certain philosophical objections to our view. We are arguing 
for moral perfectionism, the view that no actions are supererogatory – that there is no such thing 
 
1 We do not think it is possible to offer a comprehensive defence of our position in one paper. We appreciate, 
therefore, that some important objections to our thesis will inevitably go unanswered. It is our hope that we will not 
be misinterpreted as being unduly lenient on our own thesis. We have tried to identify the best arguments and 
objections for presentation here, with the hope of responding to further worthwhile objections at a later date. 
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as going ‘beyond the call of duty’.2 The best possible action is always obligatory, on our view. 
Defences of perfectionism in the literature are relatively rare except, perhaps, as part of general 
defences of consequentialism. Our work here is unique in the literature simply in virtue of offering 
an argument for this position that is not attached to a particular normative framework.   
 
 Defining Supererogation 
  ‘Supererogation’ is often understood as meaning ‘good but not obligatory’. This is 
inadequate. The reason for this is that actions may be less than obligatory but still, in some sense, 
good. This is difficult to comprehend on the ethically minimal views we are attacking, since on 
those views obligations tend to be easily achievable things which are bad if not done – like not 
killing innocent people. But if perfectionism is at least possibly true, then fulfilling obligations may 
be a much more stringent task than we might have considered. And in this case, an action which 
falls short of being the best possible action – and which is therefore not obligatory – might still be 
a (relatively) good one. For example, if utilitarianism is true, then the best use of money is probably 
donation to an incredibly effective charity like the Anti Malaria Foundation. This is, perhaps, 
obligatory. But donating it to a less effective charity – say, Compassion UK – might still be a good 
thing to do. But clearly in this case the utilitarian would say that donating to Compassion UK is 
not going beyond the call of duty, nor does it involve going the extra mile, or going above and 
beyond obligations. It falls short of our obligations. And so there are at least two possible ways in 
which an action can be good but not obligatory – by going beyond our obligations, or by falling 
short (though not too far short) of our obligations. We take it that supererogation is concerned 
only with the former, and we propose to christen the latter category ‘subobligation’.  
 
2 There are many uses of the term ‘perfectionism’ in philosophy—we use the term as stated above. Of course, one 
may agree that it is impossible to act supererogatorily, but disagree that we ought to be perfect, given something like 
moral nihilism. Therefore, a general ‘ought’ to be perfect would follow from our argument only if moral nihilism is 
false.  
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 Supererogatory acts are often understood as being morally praiseworthy acts that are 
optional. Benn (2018a) writes,  
 Like morally required actions, supererogatory actions are not forbidden and are thus 
 permissible; unlike morally required acts, they are also ‘beyond duty’. As such, 
 supererogatory actions are ‘optional’ in the sense that they are neither morally forbidden 
 nor morally required. (p. 2) 
 
Benn’s use of ‘optional’ to refer to acts that are not morally forbidden or morally required follows 
McNamara (1996) in being a distinctly moral sense of optionality, and constitutes a feature of 
supererogatory acts that she claims all views of supererogation agree on. She further argues that, 
while such actions are praiseworthy by nature, they needn’t require extreme amounts of sacrifice 
to be supererogatory; rather, they must only be comparatively costly (p. 9). We here want to agree 
with Benn and others on the optionality of supererogatory acts and remain neutral on the question 
of how costly they must be in order to be supererogatory, as such a question is tangential to our 
main argument.  
 We will postpone further detailed explication of our view. But we note the following 
features of perfectionism, which are important for our defence of it: firstly, perfectionism does 
not entail that there is only ever one right action. There may be many joint best actions available 
at any one time. Secondly, perfectionism, though it sets high standards, is still sensitive to varying 
degrees of goodness. Some non-obligatory actions may still be better than others. We will later 
argue that this spectral quality of morality actually fits better with perfectionism than with 
supererogationism. Finally, our version of perfectionism is consistent with a number of different 
normative ethical theories, and with a number of different views on blameworthiness, culpability, 
and freedom. 
 
3. Where does supererogation live? 
 In surveying the moral landscape, it is helpful to ask ourselves where we might find the 
home of supererogatory actions. Much of the literature on supererogation uses the language of 
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‘fitting’ or ‘making room’ with respect to supererogation, due to the initial difficulty of situating 
the category among the rest of various frameworks’ normative furniture (McNamara 1996, Heyd 
2015b). Because talk of the supererogatory often involves talk of obligations, it is important that a 
theory provides an answer to the questions: What are we obliged to do, and how are we to 
distinguish these obligations from actions that are supererogatory? In our attempt to pin down 
which frameworks generate the category of supererogation, we will look at typical formulations of 
three prominent normative theories—Kantian deontology, Utilitarianism, and virtue ethics—as 
well as non-standard versions of these theories and some competing frameworks. 
 
Five Aims: Methodological Preliminaries 
 This section of our paper has five aims which we think are important for our thesis. Aim 
1) is targeted: it addresses those who hold to one of these normative theories and commends 
perfectionism to them. We take it that there are at least some reasons to hold to the theories we 
consider, and we think that insofar as they are plausible theories, for those who hold to them, 
there is commensurate reason to reject supererogation. Aim 2) is a related one: we take it that 
there is at least some justification for the theories we consider, and that insofar as there is, and 
insofar as most people have a degree of agnosticism about which ethical theory is true, to the 
same extent they should avoid supererogationism. Aim 3) is to try and show that, at best, viable 
moral theories tend to be consistent with supererogation rather than actually generating the category. 
Most theories we consider are in tension with supererogation, rather than just not providing a 
natural home for it. So even if we can find some theories which make room for supererogation, 
this will not necessarily be enough to give supererogationism a reasonable probability even given 
those theories. Aim 4) is to illustrate the theoretical complexity required for systems involving 
supererogation. In order for a normative theory to convincingly suggest supererogationism, it is 
important that it not do so merely in virtue of being extremely open to add-on normative 
frameworks. Aim 5) is to show that in most cases, belief in supererogation results primarily from 
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first-order, applied-level intuitions about the extent of our obligations, rather than being 
derivative of higher-order ethical theories. This is important because it highlights the 
vulnerability of these beliefs: rather than being firmly grounded in robust ethical theory, they 
result primarily from intuitions, which we think are significantly undermined by the 
considerations we identify later in the paper. Since we argue that at best, simple theories tend only 
to permit supererogation, we think this shows that belief in supererogationism is based primarily 
on first-order intuition rather than on broader normative theory. 
 
Deontology 
 Given that supererogation is defined largely by its relation to moral obligations, it seems 
natural to try to locate this category in Kantianism. However, Kantians are largely in agreement 
that such a category is senseless (Baron 1987, p. 237-238).3 The common Kantian argument against 
such a category goes as follows: 
 P1: An action has moral worth in so far as it is done from duty to the moral law. 
 P2: Supererogatory actions, by definition, are not done from duty to the moral law. 
 C: Therefore, supererogatory actions do not have moral worth. 
 
This is a problem, because moral worth – indeed, superior moral worth – is an essential feature of 
supererogatory actions. But traditional Kantianism has no concept of moral worth as being 
separate from the sense of dutiful conformance to the moral law with which an action is done. For 
Kant, no action is unqualifiedly morally good which is not done with good will.4 ‘In Kant’s terms, 
a good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral demands or, as he often refers 
to this, by the Moral Law’ (Johnson and Cureton 2016). Because supererogatory actions are, by 
definition, actions which are not morally demanded, they cannot be done with good will. It is 
 
3 ‘Some, like von Herbert, believe that Kant's ethics asks too little, requiring only minimal decency and saying 
nothing about the ‘higher flights of morality.’ Others, reading the texts differently, believe that his theory asks too 
much, demanding total devotion to morality and treating everything worth doing (and perhaps more) as a duty. But, 
despite their differences, the two sets of critics concur in taking the central problem to be Kant's failure to recognize 
the category of the supererogatory.’ 
4 ‘There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything at all outside it, that can be 
held to be good without limitation, excepting only a good will.’ (Emboldened text our own). Kant, Groundwork for 
the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:393. 
Must We Be Perfect? 
 
7 
 
therefore difficult to see how supererogatory actions could be morally superior to obligatory 
actions, since only the latter are capable of containing the only unqualified moral good.  The 
Kantian is forced to admit that there are no morally valuable acts that one is not bound by duty to 
perform. Many Kantians cite Kant’s own unease with acts of exceeding virtue, fearing them to be 
acts of vanity, or self-congratulatory. Those who do not accept this interpretation of them suspect 
that Kantians may need to claim that these acts, generally thought to be supererogatory, are actually 
required. (Timmerman 2005) 
 Those who have tried to position supererogation within a Kantian framework typically 
turn to Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. (Hill 1971) An imperfect duty is, 
simply put, a duty to do something sometimes. Importantly, an imperfect duty is not the state of 
occasionally having a duty to do something; rather, it is a duty one always has, which is vague in 
its terms. In his paper ‘Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation’, Thomas Hill Jr. proposes 
some criteria for a supererogatory act: 
(a) is of a sort commended by a principle of wider imperfect duty,  
(b) is motivated by a sense of duty (or, perhaps, respect for moral reasons),  
(c) is neither forbidden nor required by another, more stringent duty.  
(d) is in a context where no alternative is required by more stringent duty and there is at least one alternative that 
is neither forbidden by more stringent duty nor commanded by other principles of wide duty, and  
(e) is done by an agent who has adopted the relevant principle of wider imperfect duty and has often and continually 
acted on that principle. (p. 71) 
The common example of an imperfect duty is charitable giving. If I am required by duty to 
sometimes give money to charity, then it might be thought that any particular act of charitable giving 
is supererogatory – good to do, but not required. 
 However, it is not clear that frequently performing an imperfect duty could account for 
supererogatory actions. Hill’s criterion that a supererogatory act be motivated by a sense of duty 
has been criticised by Marcia Baron (1987): ‘The real difficulty is that supererogationists are trying 
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to get away from duty, but the Kantian analysis keeps pulling what is supposed to be ‘beyond’ duty 
back under the rubric of duty.’ (p. 244) It is far from clear even on initial inspection that an action 
done according to a sense of duty (as Hill’s supererogatory actions are) could be supererogatory. 
But the most alarming feature of Hill’s case is seen when bearing in mind that supererogatory 
actions are supposed to be better than what duty requires. 
 Given this, Hill’s conception of superogatory actions simply does not account for their 
status as morally superior. Take, for instance, an imperfect duty to feed your child. This is very 
plausibly an imperfect duty, since we are required to sometimes feed our children, but we ought 
not to always be feeding them, and it is not usually necessary to feed them at any particular time. 
Certainly feeding my child more and more often would not account for better and better actions 
– overfeeding my child could be as pernicious as underfeeding her. And it is clearly implausible 
that a given act of feeding my child should be considered above and beyond the call of duty! And 
so, even though handing my child an extra apple or feeding them at any particular time could perhaps 
be considered ‘good but not required’, this is not because they exhibit any peculiar virtue: it just 
reflects the fact that there is not always a unique, determinate course of virtue. We again appeal to 
the insufficiency of the good-but-not-required definition of supererogation, which, as we 
previously noted, could also pick out ‘good’ subobligatory actions or joint best actions. 
 A conception of supererogatory acts must be able to account for their moral superiority over 
actions which are obligatory. Kant’s system can account for certain non-moral goods – for 
instance, aesthetic good, or happiness – which some action may aim at. Yet, again, because the 
only good in Kant’s moral philosophy is good will, it is difficult to see how appealing to non-moral 
goods would be able to account for the perceived moral superiority of supererogatory actions. 
 Because the problems with finding supererogation in Kantianism seem to be the result of 
Kant’s constraints on sources of goodness, some may look to other deontological systems to find 
the category. For example, a theory which does seem to allow room for supererogationism is 
Scanlon’s contractualism; however, the primary reason this theory is consistent with 
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supererogation is simply because it has such limited scope. Scanlon (1998) has a theory of what 
makes something wrong, a theory which itself has some complexity. ‘An act is wrong if its 
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general 
regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, 
general agreement.’  Similarly so for right actions: if an action wouldn’t be disallowed by the same 
sort of principles, then the action is right to do. This alone, however, is not enough to generate 
supererogation. Part of our understanding of going above and beyond one’s obligations is that the 
action is better than an action which merely fulfills an obligation. On Scanlon’s framework of right 
and wrong action, there is no account of goodness. Therefore, it is hard to imagine how to conceive 
of supererogatory actions being better than obligatory actions. Because of its limited scope, in 
order to actually give an account of right action and of moral value, it looks like Scanlon needs to 
adjoin a completely independent account of an action’s goodness, and the resulting hybrid will 
involve considerable theoretical complexity - which we take to be a theoretical vice later in the 
paper. 
 
Utilitarianism 
 Utilitarianism is, of course, a framework known for its demanding moral obligations, 
arising from the lack of space for supererogation. A general utilitarian argument against 
supererogation can be given as follows: 
P1: Supererogatory actions, by definition, go beyond what is required of us. 
P2: We are required to choose actions which maximise good results over ones which do 
not (standard utilitarianism). 
P3: Doing the maximally good action in any situation is generally considered 
supererogatory (i.e., giving away the majority of our income to charity). 
P4: But there is a contradiction: supererogatory actions can’t be required (P1). 
 C: Therefore, no actions are supererogatory. 
  
 The standard ‘good-ought tie-up’, common to nearly all consequentialist frameworks, 
creates the extreme difficulty in positing a category of actions which are neither required, nor 
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prohibited.5 What, on traditional utilitarianism, can we say is required, besides acting to maximize 
good results? And indeed, we ought not to do anything less. So actions which would typically be 
conceived of as being supererogatory will either maximize the good, or they will not, and we are 
required to do or not do them based on their outcome. Therefore, we cannot, on standard 
utilitarianism, conceive of actions which are very good to do, but not required. 
 Rule utilitarianism is sometimes thought to allow room for supererogationism, or perhaps 
even to generate the category. Rule utilitarianism holds that we are obligated to always follow rules 
that, generally speaking, maximize utility when adhered to. For instance, suppose a rule dictates 
that one should give 20% of their income to charity, because doing more than that would weary 
or frustrate them, causing them to have a bad attitude and to resent or cease all charitable giving, 
or because giving more than that would produce more bad than good due to resulting financial 
distress. Then, for Mary, there are two choices of actions which may be optimal: she could give 
20%, or she could give more than 20%. The supererogationist might say that giving at least 20% 
is obligatory, while giving more than 20% is supererogatory. 
 Rule utilitarianism is sometimes understood in at least two ways: as something like a 
pragmatic version of act utilitarianism, or as a strict set of rules generated by rules-consequences 
relationships. Under neither conception is it easy to see how Mary could act supererogatorily. If 
Mary is a pragmatic act utilitarian and thinks she is vulnerable to altruism-weariness then giving 
more than 20% would be morally inferior since it can be expected to have worse consequences. 
In order for rule utilitarianism to not collapse into act utilitarianism, obligations must be based on 
expected, and not actual, utility.  
 [I]f full rule-consequentialism claims that an act is wrong if and only if 
 the foreseeable consequences of rules allowing that act are sub-optimal, rule-
 consequentialism cannot hold that an act is wrong if and only if the actual consequences of 
 rules allowing that act will be sub-optimal. (Hooker 2016) 
 
 
5 Famously, Moore (1948). 
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If she is a pragmatic act utilitarian but is confident that she is not vulnerable to weariness then it 
seems as though she is obliged to give more, since the rule is there only to avoid the computational 
problems of calculating consequences for every individual act. But if better consequences from a 
rule-deviant action are readily recognised in a particular case, the pragmatic concerns disappear, 
and it would be supremely irrational for a pragmatic act utilitarian to preserve the rule when the 
pragmatic reasons for the rule are no longer germane.  
 If Mary is a strict rule utilitarian, on the other hand, then—since following the rules takes 
precedence over particular circumstances—she is obliged to follow the rule and give only 20% no 
matter what. Giving more constitutes a wrongful failing of obligation, not a morally superior 
supererogatory act. So, it does not seem as though rule utilitarianism will simply or clearly make 
room for supererogation.6 
 
Virtue ethics 
 There has been a recent increase of philosophical interest in exploring supererogation 
within virtue theoretic frameworks. Although at this point virtue theory may appear to be the most 
promising avenue for accommodating supererogatory actions, here we will also struggle to find a 
natural place for the category. In the words of Heyd (2015b), ‘It turned out that fitting 
supererogation into virtue-based moral theory proved to be a more difficult task than doing so in 
utilitarian and deontological theories.’7 But seeing why this is requires understanding the unique 
virtue theoretical understanding the world. Virtue ethics calls good that which promotes 
flourishing, particularly the flourishing of an agent’s character, to the fulfilment of her telos. 
Standard conceptions of right actions from a virtue theoretic perspective, such as Hursthouse 
 
6 J.S. Mill does recognise a distinction between obligatory actions and non-obligatory meritorious actions in ‘Auguste 
Comte and Positivism’; however, he does not explain how this would fit into a utilitarian framework, and indeed 
Mill’s utilitarianism is notorious for being (at best) at the fringes of what would today be labeled ‘utilitarianism’.   
7 The reason for Heyd’s difficulty was that the picture of the world assumed by virtue theories did not map on 
directly to the liberal conception of the post-enlightenment world from whence ideas of supererogation arose. 
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(1999), take a form similar to this: ‘An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically do in the circumstances.’ (p. 28). 
 But recent work on virtue ethics and supererogation have rejected Hursthouse’s model, 
instead favouring a ‘target-centered approach’ (Swanton 2001). Rebecca Stangl (2015), who adopts 
this approach herself, believes that supererogationism makes sense on this account of right action. 
In Stangl’s paper, ‘Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation’, she quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics: 
[T]here are many ways to be in error – for badness is proper to the indeterminate, 
as the Pythagoreans pictured it, and good to the determinate. But there is only one 
way to be correct. That is why error is easy and correctness is difficult, since it is 
easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it. And so for this reason also excess and 
deficiency are proper to vice, the mean to virtue; ‘for we are noble in only one way, 
but bad in all sorts of ways.’8 
 
 Roger Crisp (2013) argues that we do not have to interpret this passage to mean that, in 
any given circumstance, there is only one correct action. However, Crisp does think that this 
passage implies a strict dichotomy. Either an action of ours hits the mark, in which case it is 
virtuous, or it does not, in which case, it is vicious. And so, all virtuous actions are equally virtuous, 
and we are obliged simply to only perform virtuous actions. On Crisp’s account, there is no room 
for supererogation in an Aristotelian account of virtuous action. Stangl responds to Crisp that it 
‘is implausible to think that all virtuous actions are equally virtuous.’ (p. 353) 
 We agree that this seems implausible. But it also seems, on this view, as though there must 
be an action, or multiple actions, that are optimally virtuous. Stangl believes that actions which are 
more virtuous than they need to be in order to ‘realize their end’ or ‘hit the target’ are 
supererogatory. But conceive of it this way: the target is presumably either extended (in the sense 
of including non-best possible actions) or punctiliar. If punctiliar, then clearly there is no room for 
supererogation. If extended, then there might be. If the target is extended but admits no degrees 
of virtuosity, then it will allow no supererogation. But if it admits of degrees of virtuosity, then 
 
8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b, 29ff., quoted in Stangl, pp. 351-52. 
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there is room for supererogation. The problem here, however, is explaining why the real target is 
not the most virtuous option. Unless there is an adjunctive theory explaining why the boundaries 
of the target should be wider than simply the most virtuous possible option, and why they fall 
where they do, such wideness is arbitrary. For these reasons, the target-centered approach to virtue 
theory does not more easily allow for supererogatory actions than the standard approach does.  
 These arguments from some of the major normative ethics systems are not intended to be 
conclusive. There are, of course, several deontological, consequentialist, and virtue theoretical 
arguments that purport to make room for supererogatory acts (respectively, Brinkmann 2015, 
Hooker 2002, Kawall 2009). The point of this overview was just to show that, on the face of things, 
none of the three major normative theories seem to have a natural place for them. Perhaps space 
can be created in some or all of these systems; but now the question becomes: why make the 
space? What motivates us to try to fit such a category of actions in our normative ethical 
framework? 
 
4. Intuitions and supererogation 
 We suggest that the main support for supererogatory actions comprises a variety of related 
intuitions. This is not to say that we think intuitions are the only reasons able to be given in favour 
of supererogationism; famously, the Catholic intellectual tradition accepts the category as a way of 
distinguishing ordinary people from saintly, or particularly excellent, people (Alston 1989, Wynn 
2015). Additionally, one may have other reasons for finding a satisficing normative framework 
convincing, and conclude that, therefore, supererogatory actions must be possible. This is not 
necessarily a slur – we also take it that almost all ethical opinion is based on intuitions of varying 
kinds. But it is very plausible that the main basis for most people’s belief in supererogation is their 
intuitive belief in propositions like the following: 
 ‘Forgiving my son’s killer would be supererogatory’ 
 ‘I am not obliged to give everything I own to the poor’ 
 ‘The Good Samaritan went beyond the call of duty’ 
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These intuitions are fairly widespread, and fairly easy to arrive at oneself. There is certainly a sense 
in which many intuitions which seem to favour supererogationism. These intuitions are of varying 
kinds: intuitions that morality is not as demanding as perfectionists suggest, that we are not 
blameworthy for failing to achieve the best, that the best moral acts are in some sense optional, 
and so on. We propose that, on further evaluation, any intuitive support for supererogation 
collapses on a number of levels. 
 We note firstly that even the general trend of intuitions supporting supererogationism is 
doubtful. As we will later show in the discussion of linguistic simplicity, it is difficult to see what 
obligation even means in supererogatory systems. It is therefore difficult to see how anyone could 
genuinely have the above intuitions with an adequate grasp of the concepts involved. Moreover, 
intuitions in support of perfectionism are common. Heyd (2015a) notes: 
This ‘good-ought tie-up’ is a theoretically attractive principle: whatever is good, 
ought to be done. If an action is good, then there must be reasons for doing it. If 
it is the best possible action, the reasons for doing it are conclusive, that is 
outweighing all other reasons for not doing it (or doing something else). Failing to 
do the best action cannot therefore be immune from blame or condemnation. Or, 
in other words, doing the best is always obligatory, never optional. Supererogation 
is impossible.9 
 
This is related to the ‘paradox of supererogation’, which asks how it is possible that a good is not 
a duty. As we have explained, there is no natural answer for this in any of the major normative 
theories surveyed. Indeed, the main normative theories arguably lead us to expect that goods are 
always duties. We will reinforce this intuition with our discussion of theoretical simplicity anon. 
The intuitions favouring the theoretical simplicity of perfectionism are quite strong, and must be 
considered as evidence alongside the evidence from intuitions about supererogation. 
 As well as doubting the content of supererogatory intuitions and noting the strong 
intuitions in favour of perfectionism, we can offer a variety of undercutting defeaters against 
 
9 To avoid mischaracterizing Heyd, we note that this quote does not describe his own view ( in his book 
Supererogation (1982) he defends a supererogationist framework) but rather the view of someone who holds to the 
good-ought tie-up. 
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supererogatory intuitions. We begin with some brief considerations against particular pro-
supererogation intuitions. 
 It is thought by some that a good action’s being optional adds some value to it. This is 
taken to support supererogationism since supererogationism makes certain acts morally optional. 
Heyd (1982) argues that this ‘unqualified’ freedom to act or not act is precisely what makes 
supererogatory actions so praiseworthy—this freedom entails that the action was performed, not 
from fear of sanction, but from personal preferences and values (p. 175). We appreciate this 
intuition and want to say two things in response. First, it might be the case that if 
supererogationism is true, then there is a distinct kind of value in its moral optionality that cannot 
be posited on perfectionism. We do not need to deny this here, for our aim in this section is not 
to show that supererogationism is false – only that the intuitions in support of it can be explained 
in a way that is consistent with perfectionism. For this, all we need to do is give a plausible 
explanation of why it seems very strongly to us that optional acts have distinct value in a way that 
is consistent with perfectionism.  
 Second, we submit that these intuitions can be explained without the kind of optionality 
that supererogationism provides. There are at least two other sources that are adequate to explain 
the goodness of these kinds of actions: libertarian free will and unrewarded goods. Libertarian 
choices for the good are thought to be good precisely because the agent did not have to perform 
it – there is a sense in which the action was optional, even if that is not a moral sense. We can 
think of this kind of optionality as the freedom from threat of sanction. For instance, one has the 
option of forgoing parental rights, even if doing so is morally wrong. If there is no threat of 
sanction, then we recognise that the act was not performed in order to avoid such sanction. This 
is augmented when the choice is unrewarded. It is very plausible that the main reason optional acts 
are good is because they are done truly selflessly – there is no reward in them, no obvious gain for 
the agent. So, it is perfectly plausible that our intuition that optional acts are good is derivative of 
our appreciation for selflessness, as the supererogationist admits. Where we believe the 
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supererogationist errs is in her assertion that such selflessness of motivation can only be found on 
a perfectionist framework. Indeed, this selflessness does not seem to have very much to do with 
supererogation.  
 It is objected at this juncture by Rebecca Stangl that these explanations of the exceptional 
goodness of more demanding acts are not the best way to account for certain mundane scenarios.10 
[They] point to the example of missing a flight through their own negligence and arriving at the 
destination at 2am instead of 8pm. The sister collecting them from the airport does better if she 
still agrees to come out at 2am rather than the previously agreed 8pm. Since neither case 
exemplifies a greater degree of libertarian freedom, and since the sister receives no reward in either 
case, these perfectionist explanations do not seem to explain the relative quality of arriving at 2am. 
 The above account is unclear, since it compares two actions in two different situations. 
Presumably the best (or joint best) action in both cases is to pick up the passenger when they arrive 
- after all, if the passenger arrived at 8pm as planned, it would hardly be morally superior for the 
sister to arrive at 2am! It just happens that the best thing to do in the punctual case is not too great 
a sacrifice for the sister. This should not surprise us: we already know that morality is sometimes 
easy, and sometimes more difficult. Perfection demands more at some times than others. So, 
although the perfectionist will say that they are equally good in some sense (in that they are both 
best actions given each circumstance), they can still grant that the non-punctual case involves a 
better action in another sense. The challenge is whether perfectionists can give a good explanation 
of this ‘betterness’ without recourse to supererogation. 
 In fact, we can: namely, the sacrifice and selflessness involved. As [our interlocutor] writes, 
‘the obvious answer is that the [2am] pickup costs my sister more.’ They go on to conclude that in 
doing so, the sister ‘goes the extra mile’. We agree fully with the initial diagnosis: indeed, the 
suggestion that some ‘optional’ actions are better on account of their being more selfless is already 
 
10 In comments on an earlier draft of this paper given at the Logos Workshop, University of Notre Dame, 2016. 
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present in our suggestion that the good of unrewarded virtue is derivative of the good of 
selflessness. This explains the situation in a way that is consistent with our common intuitions, and 
yet reveals no need to involve notions of supererogation. 
 One worry with cases like the airport scenario – and perhaps a subconscious worry with 
perfectionism more generally – is that suggesting that we are obliged to perform these demanding 
acts of kindness yields an aberrant view of moral life: it seems to suggest that the moral life consists 
of no more than a multiplicity of extravagant, unrelated and disproportionate acts of kindness and 
self-sacrifice – an intuition not consonant with most people’s view of the ideally virtuous person. 
Susan Wolf famously raises a similar critique in ‘Moral Saints’, arguing that the lives of ‘moral 
saints’—which she defines as people whose every act is as morally good as possible (p. 419)— 
neglect other goods and values in the attaining of solely moral perfection. Benn (2015) argues that 
the demandingness of perfection takes the form of a constraint on the autonomy of the agent, 
shrinking her set of permissible actions down to a small pool. She coins the ‘Confinement 
Objection’, which holds that a moral theory is implausibly demanding if it constrains the set of 
actions available to us in such a way.  This is one sort of demandingness objection: that the 
demands themselves are too difficult or constricting to be required of, or even good for, the agent. 
 In another paper, Benn (2018b) argues for a different sort of demandingness objection: 
that perfectionism, when demanded of someone, undercuts itself by making it even harder for the 
agent to do good. ‘[T]he consequences of believing ourselves to be morally obliged to do what is 
morally best are likely to be depression and anxiety, especially given that moral standards are often 
viewed as having an external source.’ (p.17) Such mental strain, she argues, can cause us to focus 
too much on avoiding sanctions. ‘[B]y trying to avoid failing to meet the standards, we tend to 
avoid meeting them.’ (p. 18) This critique of what she calls ‘psychological perfectionism’ recalls 
Parfit’s well-known critique of consequentialist moral theories (1984), where he argues that such 
theories are ‘self-effacing’ (part 1, section 10, pp. 24-25). That is, by trying or intending to fulfil the 
aims of some consequentialist theories (e.g. maximizing overall happiness) we prevent ourselves 
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from fulfilling the these aims as well as we might otherwise  have done had we mentally 
accepted some other normative framework. 
 It would be ignorant to deny that moral anxiety can impede one’s ability to fulfil their 
obligations. We hope we have made it clear throughout the paper, however, that perfectionism is 
not committed to any detailed view of what the perfect moral life looks like – any such caricatures 
are a function of a presumed set of values not central to (or even associated with) perfectionism. 
Perfectionism is compatible with the thesis, for example, that the perfect life involves considerable 
amounts of mundane actions oriented towards particular goals and callings, rather than a 
disconnected series of extravagantly and unnecessarily sacrificial actions. It does make room, of 
course, for extravagant sacrifice.  
 Additionally, Benn’s picture of moral anxiety seems not to apply to normative frameworks 
like virtue ethics, which standardly denies deontic concepts like obligations, duties, rights, etc. 
Virtue ethics generally prefers a picture where there are no distinctly moral ‘oughts’, and holds that 
to say we ought to do or ought not to do something is just to describe how close to, or removed 
from, the ideal human such behaviour would be. Perfectionism may be true in the absence of 
obligations, so long as there is no way to go beyond or do better than what we ought to do.  
 Another pro-supererogation intuition is that we are not always blameworthy when we fail 
to be perfect. Likewise, this is easily explicable without the resources of supererogationism. A very 
simple reason exists for this: we are not always blameworthy when we fail to be perfect because 
there are exculpating factors other than an action not being obligatory. For example, exculpating 
factors include ignorance, practical inability, extreme demandingness, and so on. Perfectionists are 
not committed to the view that anything less than perfection is blameworthy, as we note later in 
the context of responding to various other putatively pro-supererogation intuitions.11 
 
11 In any case, why think that we are not always blameworthy? Maybe we are just really, really bad. We wish to leave 
this position open. 
Must We Be Perfect? 
 
19 
 
 Let us turn to a more global concern about moral justification. Concerns have been raised 
regarding the possibility of genuinely justified moral knowledge – most notably, on the basis of 
evolutionary debunking arguments.12 We believe that there is considerable force to these 
arguments, in which case most – if not all – moral claims are suspect. 
 The global success of sceptical arguments is not required for our thesis, however. We can 
still grant that intuitions reliably grant us a significant amount of moral knowledge – about whether 
pleasure is a good, for example. But on the face of it, whether a good action is supererogatory or 
obligatory seems so obscure that it is incredibly difficult to see how we could have any reliable 
knowledge about this at all. If obligation does not fall at the end of the moral spectrum, how do 
we know where it falls? Are almost all good actions obligatory? Are virtually no actions obligatory? 
How are we supposed to judge? And how is it at all plausible that the selection pressures facing 
early hominids were ones that helped them to make these sorts of obscure metaphysical 
judgments? We will develop this point later in our discussion of maximal degree simplicity. But 
for now it is worth noting the ease with which scepticism arises when we ask how we know where 
the dividing line between obligatory and supererogatory sits and why it sits there. 
 A final intuition that seems to support supererogationism is the intuition that ‘we’re not 
really that bad’. Perfectionism is often associated with the idea that buying a frivolous cup of coffee 
constitutes a shirking of our obligations and is a blameworthy act (though later in the paper we 
will show why these claims do not necessarily follow from perfectionism). It seems implausible to 
many people that they fail to meet most of their obligations and fail so frequently. While it is 
consistent with our thesis that most people fulfil most of their obligations (though we consider it 
unlikely), we note here simply that this intuition about our general goodness is not as secure as we 
would like. In the first place, the empirical data are clear that most of us are not very good when 
it comes to certain evils. For example, most of us are content with living in luxury while others 
 
12 E.g. Street, ‘A Darwinist Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’. 
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live in abject poverty, even when these facts are well-known to us and small sacrifices of our own 
could relieve considerable poverty elsewhere in the world. Most of us are also perfectly at ease 
with apathetic and thoughtless contributions to corporate evils, and most of us are small steps 
away from being moral villains if only our life circumstances turned out differently. It is quite likely, 
in light of these, that the main reason we are convinced of our own decency is renormalising our 
moral calibration in light of the fact that everyone around us acts fairly similarly. More on this 
shortly. 
 There are empirical data supporting the claim that we are prone to overestimate our own 
rectitude. Illusory superiority is a well-known psychological phenomenon, according to which 
people have a tendency to overestimate their abilities in an enormous variety of domains – IQ, 
popularity, health, driving ability, and so on. This generates the amusing statistic that the large 
majority of people consider themselves to be generally above average. Particularly interesting is 
the Dunning-Kruger effect, where it is low-skilled experimental participants who have a particular 
tendency to overestimate their own abilities, and an inability to recognise their own inabilities. This 
indicates an analogue in the moral sphere: we would expect people in general to overestimate their 
own moral stature,13 and in particular we would expect the most morally bankrupt to suffer from 
this effect the most. So our tendency to believe that we generally fulfil our obligations is entirely 
to be expected given the general empirical data, the intuitive plausibility of supererogationism and 
the results of moral psychology, which all mutually reinforce each other. 
 This is not the only relevant psychological evidence. Moral self-licensing is another well-
documented phenomenon whereby subjects tend to act less morally when they have previously 
acted morally. Remarkably, people have a tendency to act less morally even just after imagining 
themselves acting morally (see Merritt et al 2010). Humans have a tendency to overestimate their 
own moral goodness, and even to use their own morality as an excuse for acting wrongly in future. 
 
13 This has, in fact, been documented. See Hoorens, ‘Self-Favoring Biases, Self-Presentation, and the Self-Other 
Asymmetry in Social Comparison’. 
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Even thinking of themselves as moral makes them prone – unknown to them – to act wrongly. 
This constitutes a further category of evidence showing that humans are probably significantly 
worse than they generally consider themselves to be.14 
 Even in the absence of empirical evidence, we would probably expect humans to 
significantly underestimate the number of obligations they have. Why? If most humans are selfish 
and judgmental, and if they drastically fail to meet their obligations, it is very plausible that they 
would both lower their expectations and judge themselves relative to those around them. Humans 
have a very strong tendency to judge others and to compare themselves to others, and so the 
‘average person’ becomes the relevant comparison class for moral self-judgment, rather than the 
actual standard of obligation. But since most humans are far from perfect, so they reduce their 
expectations accordingly. Indeed, retaining a high standard of obligations would make inter-human 
comparison very difficult, since almost all humans would fail drastically and so only be marginally 
different from each other. There is thus good practical reason for humans to renormalise their 
measure of obligation by limiting obligations to what might be expected of the average person. 
This allows a much more sensitive comparison of different humans where we really can insist that 
we are importantly better than others. 
 In sum, then, there is ample, independent, empirical plausibility to the thesis that we are 
not really as good as we are prone to think. This – though not required by perfectionism – is 
consonant with it, and lends credibility to it as well as undermining any objections predicated on 
our moral decency. 
 
5. Perfectionism is theoretically simpler 
Having undercut much intuitive or theoretical support for supererogationism, we now turn to our 
central positive argument for perfectionism: that perfectionism is theoretically simpler in a number 
 
14 To be clear, we are not claiming that these experimental results are impossible – or even difficult – to explain on 
supererogationism. We only suggest that they undercut the force of the objection to perfectionism that we’re not so 
bad – humans are notoriously prone to overestimating their goodness. 
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of senses. We, along with others, have argued elsewhere that simplicity is an index of truth,15 
though we do not have space to defend that assumption here. Note, however, that in the absence 
of empirical evidence, simplicity is an extremely strong criterion for determining how likely a theory 
is to be true. So, all else (in particular, explanatory power) being equal, a simpler theory is more 
likely to be true. We have argued in the previous section that the explanatory power of 
perfectionism is no worse than that of supererogationism, so that if perfectionism wins on 
simplicity, it is a stronger theory overall. 
There are at least three respects in which perfectionism is simpler than supererogationism: 
linguistic simplicity, ideological parsimony, and maximal degree simplicity. We will take each of 
these in turn. 
 There has been much debate about lexical and syntactic simplicity, mostly to do with the 
length of expression of some hypothesis or other in a given language. For example, it is often held 
that hypotheses which can be expressed by a shorter string in given computing languages are 
simpler and more likely to be true. There are many cases where simplicity in natural languages is 
preferred, or where there is a preference for predicates occurring in natural language over 
gerrymandered predicates like ‘grue’. Linguistic simplicity is often indicative, though not 
constitutive, of conceptual simplicity. 
 Perfectionism is linguistically simple in the following sense: it maintains that ‘ought’ is 
univocal. This can perhaps best be seen by contrasting it with what supererogationism says about 
these kinds of words. According to supererogationism, ‘ought’ can imply an obligation, as in, ‘you 
ought not to steal that ice cream’. But it can also mean something relating to supererogation, as in, 
‘you ought to be perfect’. This latter proposition is incredibly plausible. It is good to be perfect, 
and if moral reasons are intrinsically motivational or reason-giving, then an action’s being good 
gives one a normative reason to bring it about. It is overwhelmingly plausible that the reasons in 
 
15 See, for example, Miller 2016. 
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favour of an action are intimately linked with the concept of ‘ought’, and so the more reasons there 
are in favour of an action the stronger the ‘ought’. So, given the overwhelming moral reasons in 
favour of being perfect, it is highly probable that we ought to be perfect. But the supererogationist 
finds it much more difficult to explain what is meant by ‘ought’ in this case. They will have to give 
a meaning of ‘ought’ distinct from the special sense of ‘ought’ they give in assertions of obligation. 
And this multiplies the senses of ‘ought’ and so introduces needless linguistic complexity. By 
contrast, the perfectionist has a simple explanation of ‘ought’: to say that we ought to do something 
means that we have good moral reasons to do it, and the strength of the ‘ought’ varies in line with 
the strength of those reasons. This is a far simpler view of our moral discourse, and a far simpler 
view of the relationship between reasons and obligations. 
 This simplicity is arguably due to a deeper – and probably more relevant – simplicity, viz. 
ideological parsimony. Ideological parsimony has various aspects, the most important of which is 
the minimisation of concepts – we want to explain as much of the world as possible with as few 
conceptual resources as possible. Ideological parsimony may be quantitative—fewer concepts all 
together—or it may be qualitative—fewer types of concepts. These are what make for an elegant 
and genuinely explanatory system. But it is clear in light of the foregoing discussion that 
supererogationism involves a gratuitous inflation of both quantity and types of moral concepts 
employed in our deontic logic. Perfectionists have moral reasons and a conception of ‘ought’ that 
strengthens linearly with it and have just two fundamental categories – obligatory and non-
obligatory. By contrast, supererogationists have obligatory actions sitting in the middle of the 
moral spectrum, with two completely different kinds of actions each side: on one side, non-
obligatory blameworthy acts, and on the other side, non-obligatory praiseworthy acts. And their 
conception of ‘ought’ is tied in a complicated manner to both obligatory acts and supererogatory 
acts. Or, from a different perspective, they have a moral spectrum with heinous acts on one end 
and supererogatory acts on the other: a fairly simple system similar to that of the perfectionist. But 
a further obscure category is then imposed: the merely obligatory, where obligation is a fairly 
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enigmatic notion which is not easily reducible or linked to any other prior moral concept. On the 
perfectionist picture, moral reasons are straightforwardly linked to both praiseworthiness and 
obligations: you are obliged to do (one of) the action(s) you have the most moral reasons for, and 
the more moral reasons you act on, the more praiseworthy your actions is, and the more moral 
reasons you eschew, the more blameworthy your action is. On supererogationism, there is no such 
link between praiseworthiness, obligations, and moral reasons. That is, if moral reasons determine 
obligations, then the praiseworthiness of supererogatory acts cannot be determined by moral 
reasons. On the other hand, if moral reasons determine praiseworthiness, then obligations are not 
linked to (or are arbitrarily linked to a certain amount of) moral reasons. Assuming perfectionists 
can explain the moral landscape as well as supererogationists, this constitutes an offensive 
multiplication of kinds.16  
The Supererogationist Picture 
Less than obligatory Obligatory Supererogatory 
 
Less Praiseworthy                              More Praiseworthy 
 
The Perfectionist Picture 
Less than obligatory Obligatory 
 
Less Praiseworthy                           Moral Reasons               More Praiseworthy 
 
 
 Finally, there is a kind of simplicity which we call maximal degree simplicity. This was 
introduced by Richard Swinburne (2004, p. 55) and has been defended in more detail by the present 
authors (Miller 2016). The idea is that maximal degrees of properties are simpler than non-
maximal, large degrees of properties. So, for example, omnipotence is held to be a simpler property 
 
16 See McNamara (1996) for an illustration of this point: his very sophisticated analysis of the structure and 
interrelationships of moral concepts is in part reflective of the multiplicity of concepts he needs to incorporate the 
supererogatory. 
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than megapotence. This is relevant because perfectionists hold that obligation is simply reducible 
to a maximal degree of goodness. This makes obligation a simple – almost trivial – addition to the 
already simple view of moral reasons and axiology. Supererogationism, on the other hand, has a 
relatively obscure view of moral reasons and axiology to begin with – it is not clear whether moral 
reasons generate a stronger ‘ought’, for example. In addition to this, there is the imposition of a 
new category, obligation, whose relationship with moral reasons and the strength of ‘ought’ is 
entirely unclear. It is not simply reducible to a maximal degree of goodness, but rather it lands 
fairly arbitrarily on the moral spectrum, with little explanation of why it lands there rather than 
anywhere else on the spectrum. This gives it a considerable degree of complexity in comparison 
with the perfectionist view. 
 We noted earlier that there is no natural place for supererogation in any of the main 
competing normative ethical traditions. This discussion of theoretical simplicity reinforces these 
arguments by showing what an unnatural and ontologically weighty theoretical resource the 
supererogationist view of obligation turns out to be. On perfectionism, obligation is easily 
reducible to prior theoretical resources. On supererogationism, it comes as a surprise, with no 
obvious explanation of its existence, its position on the moral spectrum, or any other of its features. 
This is true with respect to any given ethical paradigm, and as we have now shown, this is a 
symptom of a more fundamental theoretical problem. 
 
6. Objections 
Multiple Best Actions  
 It may be objected that we can never be obligated to perform two incompatible actions. 
But since there are often two equally good actions, which are also better than any other possible 
action, at least one (and perhaps both) must be supererogatory. We respond, first, that this would 
not suffice for supererogation, since the ostensibly supererogatory action would not be going 
beyond duty – only rising in parallel with it. A supererogationist may object that, because one may 
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perform either of the two acts, this suffices to make the act optional and, therefore, supererogatory. 
However, in this case, the optionality is shallow. On the perfectionist picture, for any given 
situation there is a set of best actions (perfectionism need not hold that there is always only one 
uniquely best act). While none of these are uniquely obligatory, their disjunction is.17 That is, while 
there is a thin sense in which I have the option of performing action A, I do not have the option 
of not performing one of the actions in the set; I must perform (for example) either A or B. 
 
Degrees of Imperfection 
 This discussion permits us to respond to a further objection: by making the demands of 
morality so stringent, perfectionism is not sufficiently sensitive to the variety of suboptimal actions, 
dismissing them all as failures. But there is no reason to suppose that perfectionism is any less 
sensitive to a spectrum of good vs bad than is supererogationism. Just as supererogationists with 
their ternary or quaternary categorisation of actions can still say that some actions within a category 
are better than others (for example, killing a child is worse than beating a child, even though both 
are strictly impermissible), so perfectionists can equally say that some non-obligatory actions are 
better or worse than others. Indeed, as we saw in the discussion of theoretical simplicity, the 
spectral quality of morality actually fits better with perfectionism than with supererogationism. 
 
Optimising Agents are Bad Agents 
 There is another worry in this vicinity, which is that perfectionism’s desire for moral 
optimisation is too cold and calculating to properly represent our sense of agency in the ethical 
arena. By focusing so intensely on the best possible action to do the most good, perfectionists 
become resistant to ordinary, less ‘efficient’ means of doing good, like buying a homeless person 
a cup of coffee at the expense of buying potentially life-saving malaria nets for vulnerable people 
 
17 This allows us to respond to the following objection: is the omission of a best action not a failure of obligation? We 
propose that this omission is simply morally indeterminate, as are many other under-described actions (like the action 
of removing someone’s appendix, which is sometimes good but in most scenarios fairly perverse). 
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in Nigeria. Bernard Williams (1973) raises a similar concern for utilitarianism, arguing that if 
utilitarianism is true, then the right answer to various moral dilemmas should be obvious; but the 
answers are not obvious, and this is evidence against the theory. The objection to our thesis alleges 
that perfectionists want to say that buying coffee for a homeless person is a failure to meet our 
obligations – a wrong. And this is counterintuitive to many people. 
 We respond in four ways: first, as noted above, that perfectionism may still be sensitive to 
different ways of failing our obligations – there is still the world of difference between barely 
subobligatory good acts and heinous crimes. Second, we note that this problem is not unique to 
perfectionism. For supererogationists, it will be equally true to say ‘you could have done better’ 
and, arguably, ‘you should have done better’ to the generous coffee-giver. It is not clear why this 
is any more intuitively acceptable than the claim that the coffee-giver failed his obligations. Third, 
as we have already discussed, insofar as this is similar to the ‘we’re not so bad’ objection, the force 
of this objection is undermined considerably by the empirical evidence presented above. 
 Fourth, we note that if this result really is unacceptable, it is not a result of perfectionism 
per se. Rather, it is a function of the conjugated ethical system in play. The objection assumes that 
the relevant ethical system is essentially utilitarian – where morality is tightly correlated with, and 
largely a function of, axiology. In this sort of utilitarian system, where any dividing line between 
obligatory and supererogatory is likely to be arbitrary and implausible, the obligatory action will 
always be the one which maximises the relevant axiological parameter (e.g. pleasure). And in this 
case, clearly anything less will be a failure of obligations. Since there is no natural place for a 
division between supererogatory and obligatory actions on these utilitarian views, utilitarianism 
naturally commends only the best action as obligatory. But then it is clear that the real problem 
with this result, as Williams points out, is utilitarianism, not perfectionism. Perhaps the following 
diagnosis is correct: because perfectionism and utilitarianism are both concerned with optimisation 
in some sense, they are thought by many people to naturally fit together. But there is no reason 
why perfectionists should be particularly keen on utilitarianism vis-à-vis other normative ethical 
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theories. Perfectionists are free to endorse any number of ethical systems, or even a collection of 
first-order moral judgments not easily reducible to any simple normative formula. 
 In utilitarian theories, the morality of action tends to be tightly linked with consequences 
and states of affairs – and in particular, the morality of an action is a proportional function of the 
axiological value of the resultant state of affairs. The better the (intended or actual) resultant state 
of affairs, the better the action. Clearly most ethical systems take resultant states of affairs into 
account, but they are not the only determinants of the morality of an action, and it is certainly not 
the case that the morality of an action linearly follows the value of the consequences. There is no 
clear reason in our own ethics, for example, to suppose that working for an hour and donating the 
£10 to the Anti Malaria Foundation is always better than spending that hour tutoring a struggling 
student at a local school. Which is better will depend on a number of other factors, and in some 
or many cases neither will be better than the other. The only reason we may seem forced to choose 
is if we have been tricked into accepting a consequentialist paradigm that is simply alien to our 
own ethics, and the ethics of many others.18 Likewise, there is no reason to think that a perfectionist 
version of any given ethical system entails that the more effective donation is better than the less 
effective tutoring. So, perfectionism is certainly not committed to the wrongness of less than 
maximally efficient good actions. 
 
Supererogation and Rights 
 Another objection is that moral intuitions are not the only support that supererogation 
enjoys. Benn (2017) argues that the existence of a category of supererogatory actions is entailed by 
some conceptions of natural ‘paired’ rights: ‘Anyone who accepts the existence of paired rights on 
any plausible account of rights therefore also accepts the possibility of supererogatory actions’ (p. 
279). By ‘paired rights’ Benn refers to morally significant acts that are also optional—that is, non-
 
18 This is not to say that consequences are irrelevant, or that we should not at all aim for efficiency in their charitable 
giving. 
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discretionary actions that we may permissibly do or refrain from doing. An example of such a right 
may be the right to demand the repayment of a loan. Accepting such a category entails the 
acceptance of supererogation, Benn argues, because while we accept the moral significance of the 
action, we lack a duty to either do or refrain from doing it. Therefore, deciding to forgo your right 
and forgive your debtors, while exceedingly morally good, is supererogatory. 
 We do not deny that other features of normative landscape that one accepts may lend 
support to supererogation. While Benn herself does not offer a defence of such natural rights in 
this paper, she argues that any evidence for their existence may also be evidence for supererogation. 
If one accepts these sorts of natural rights, Benn describes supererogation as appearing on the 
scene as ‘spandrels’, forming naturally from the rest of the normative architecture. We are not 
concerned, however, that such an entailment constitutes a threat to our argument, for two reasons.  
 First, we presume that a common conception of natural rights is Lockean in nature and, 
therefore, far more general than the examples of specific ‘paired rights’ that Benn describes—for 
instance, we have a ‘right’ to life, but do we really have a ‘right’ to forgive a loan? If a law were 
passed forbidding loaners to forgive loans, would this law trample on one of our natural rights? It 
is not clear to us that the word ‘right’ is being used univocally in these two cases. 
 Second, what is the nature of such rights? For the purpose of making an argument in 
favour of supererogation, it cannot be as simple as ‘those things we have the moral option of doing 
or not doing’—this would beg the question in favour of supererogationists. Any conception of 
rights that produce supererogation as ‘spandrels’ would need to be more theoretically filled-out 
without relying on supererogation as a theoretical assumption. While we do not want to argue that 
such a task would be impossible, we are unsure ourselves how such an argument would go. 
 
Perfectionism Mischaracterises Obligations 
 One may think that a necessary feature of something’s being a moral obligation is that they 
may be forced, or may force others, to fulfil it. While this at first seems like a tidy way of delineating 
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obligatory actions from supererogatory ones, we find this notion highly uncompelling for a few 
reasons. The first is that the category of things we may be forced to do, or force others to do, is 
highly contingent on in the particular laws of land. Under the Third Reich, certain people groups 
could be forced into ghettos. Because we almost certainly do not want to say that these individuals 
had a moral obligation to comply, it is clear that not all things we can be forced to do are obligations 
of ours. The ability to compel, therefore, cannot be sufficient for something’s being an obligation.  
 A more charitable way of understanding this sort of compulsion is to say that our 
obligations are those things we may be legitimately compelled to do (which would, of course, not 
apply to the case of those forced into ghettos). Narveson (1999) seems to hold a similar view about 
obligations of justice: 
 Another important question, which has cropped up in some of our discussions but is 
 nowhere more clearly  relevant than here, is the distinction between justice and charity. By 
 justice I here intend those things that we may, if need be, be forced to do—where our 
 actions can be constrained by others to ensure our performance. (p. 144) 
 
 Narveson’s use of this distinction applies here only to obligations of justice (he still holds that 
there are non-enforceable duties of charity), but one may imagine expanding the scope of this idea 
to distinguish all supererogatory acts from all obligatory acts. Still, it is relatively easy to think of 
cases where this seems wrong. For example, we may think that the state can legitimately prohibit 
the murder of innocents; however, depending on one’s normative framework, we may also think 
that we are obliged to disregard this legitimate prohibition and murder one innocent for the sake 
of saving hundreds of other innocent lives. 
 Additionally, we doubt that ability to compel is even a necessary feature of moral 
obligations. Consider the following statement: fathers who have the means and ability ought to 
parent their children. This is a very plausible candidate for a moral obligation. Yet, a father cannot 
be forced to do so (though he may be forced to pay child support). Not only can the state not 
compel involuntary parenting, but we may also think that nobody can legitimately compel others 
to fulfil relational roles, even if such fulfilling is clearly obligatory. 
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Failure and Blame 
 Our final clarification is with regards to blameworthiness. We do not aim to discuss 
blameworthiness in detail in this paper, for lack of space. But there is an objection that 
perfectionists necessarily hold people to be blameworthy for performing anything other than the 
best, obligatory action. Indeed, some build blameworthiness into the very definition of 
supererogation: an action is supererogatory if it is praiseworthy to perform, but not blameworthy 
not to omit (for example, Mellema 1991, p. 13). We do not accept these entailments, because we 
do not accept a linear relationship between the goodness of an action and the degree of 
blameworthiness associated with it. There may be many exculpating reasons for any given action 
which are related to factors other than the goodness of the action itself. Perfectionism is not 
committed to affirming culpability for any failure to perform the obligatory action or disjunction 
of actions. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 In sum, we have clarified our concept of supererogation as follows: supererogation does 
not relate merely to good but morally optional actions. An extra criterion is needed: supererogatory 
acts must be better than the mere fulfilling of obligations. Along with others, we have asserted that 
supererogatory actions are costlier in any given scenario than would be the mere meeting of 
obligations. We have also clarified our conception of perfectionism: perfectionism does not entail 
a uniquely best action in all circumstances. It is compatible with – and especially consonant with 
– the view that non-obligatory actions can still range anywhere from utterly heinous to nearly 
perfect. Finally, perfectionism is consistent with a variety of ethical theories and is not wedded to 
cold, impersonal calculations about how to pick the best of millions of possible options. While we 
wish neither to undermine the importance of striving for the very best, nor to exclude the 
possibility that there are very few best possible actions in any given case, our theory leaves it 
entirely open how large the set of best possible actions is. 
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 In this paper, we have shown belief in supererogatory actions, so conceived, to be 
erroneous on several grounds: the lack of natural room for them in the standard versions of the 
three main normative ethical systems, as well as some non-standard and competing systems; 
supererogationism’s dependence upon intuitions about our moral status; and its theoretical 
complexity vis-à-vis perfectionism. 
 We do not deny that supererogationism is intuitively appealing, and we do not seek to 
claim that intuitions never offer insight on important ethical issues. What we have sought to do is 
show that belief in supererogatory actions relies almost solely on intuitions, and especially 
intuitions about our moral standing, and that in this case this is very shaky ground. The preference 
for simplicity, our moral theories themselves, and the relevant empirical data all support the thesis 
that obligations are far more widespread than we might have otherwise conceived. Naturally, 
therefore, it is also plausible that we fail them more often than we might have otherwise 
conceived—a notion that should keep us both sombre and vigilant. 
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